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Abstract:	  	  	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  health	  care	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  being	  changed	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  substantial	  new	  apparatus	  of	  European	  fiscal	  governance.	  A	  series	  of	  treaties	  and	  legal	  changes	  since	  2008	  have	  given	  the	  EU	  new	  powers	  and	  duties	  to	  enforce	  budgetary	  austerity	  in	  the	  member	  states,	  and	  this	  apparatus	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  has	  already	  extended	  to	  include	  detailed	  and	  sometimes	  coercive	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  member	  states	  about	  the	  governance	  of	  their	  health	  care	  systems.	  We	  map	  the	  structures	  of	  this	  new	  fiscal	  governance	  and	  the	  way	  it	  purports	  to	  affect	  health	  care	  decisionmaking.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  is	  a	  largely	  new	  system,	  built	  since	  2010,	  in	  which	  the	  institutions	  and	  member	  states	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  monitor	  and	  constrain	  each	  others’	  finances	  and	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  deficits	  below	  3%	  and	  debt	  below	  60%	  of	  GDP.	  Focused	  on	  public	  expenditure,	  it	  promises	  to	  shape	  the	  health	  systems	  of	  EU	  member	  states.	  without	  being	  driven	  or	  justified	  by	  concerns	  with	  health	  systems.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  directed	  at	  ensuring	  conformity	  with	  a	  set	  of	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  policy	  objectives	  in	  member	  states.	  Because	  health	  systems	  are	  large,	  expensive,	  and	  public,	  they	  are	  targets	  of	  any	  fiscal	  governance	  system	  that	  tries	  to	  constrain	  state	  expenditure	  1.	  That	  is	  a	  pattern	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  EU	  health	  policies	  before	  2.	  Because	  the	  EU’s	  powers	  under	  Article	  168	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  for	  healthcare	  policy	  are	  weak,	  and	  member	  states	  are	  reluctant	  to	  support	  EU	  health	  policies,	  policies	  affecting	  health	  and	  healthcare	  have	  traditionally	  been	  driven	  by	  other	  concerns	  such	  as	  market	  integration,	  environmental	  protection,	  or	  competition	  law,	  and	  based	  on	  those	  treaty	  articles	  3.	  	   This	  paper,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  special	  issue	  on	  austerity	  and	  health	  in	  Europe,	  focuses	  on	  the	  substantial	  institutional	  changes	  made	  to	  the	  EU	  since	  2010	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  that	  began	  in	  2008	  and	  that	  manifested	  as	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  in	  2010.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  health	  care	  in	  the	  EU,	  by	  which	  we	  mean	  the	  relationship	  between	  political	  and	  economic	  power,	  has	  been	  modified	  by	  these	  extensive	  changes.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  made	  substantial	  claims	  of	  authority	  over	  health	  care	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systems	  in	  the	  name	  of	  overall	  fiscal	  governance	  rather	  than	  health	  care;	  that	  the	  system	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  that	  now	  includes	  health	  care	  is	  primarily	  designed	  to	  constrain	  expenditure	  rather	  than	  promote	  health	  or	  other	  goals;	  and	  that	  the	  sustainability	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  system	  remain	  to	  be	  seen	  but	  could	  be	  important	  issues.	  	  The	  next	  section	  discusses	  the	  crisis	  as	  it	  happened,	  starting	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  market	  confidence	  in	  Greek	  debt	  and	  the	  cascading	  bond	  market	  problems	  of	  different	  Eurozone	  members.	  Member	  states	  reacted	  with	  a	  short	  term	  expedient,	  providing	  large	  loans	  subject	  to	  the	  supervision	  of	  an	  intrusitve	  	  “Troika”	  of	  the	  European	  Commission,	  IMF,	  and,	  with	  essentially	  no	  legal	  or	  theoretical	  backing,	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank.	  The	  Troika’s	  task	  was	  to	  make	  specific	  policy	  recommendations	  and	  release	  financial	  support	  in	  return	  for	  compliance	  with	  the	  policies.	  	  Member	  states	  also	  reacted	  with	  a	  longer-­‐term	  effort	  to	  police	  EU	  member	  state	  finances	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  old	  fiscal	  governance	  systems	  that	  had	  self-­‐evidently	  failed	  to	  prevent	  a	  crisis.	  The	  third	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  discusses	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  fiscal	  governance	  system	  that	  they	  built	  through	  legislation	  and	  a	  new	  treaty.	  The	  fourth	  section	  focuses	  in	  on	  the	  part	  of	  that	  architecture	  most	  directly	  concerned	  with	  health	  systems,	  namely	  the	  “European	  Semester”,	  a	  process	  that	  gives	  increasingly	  specific	  and	  detailed	  instructions	  about	  health	  policies	  to	  member	  states.	  The	  fifth	  section	  discusses	  what	  we	  know	  so	  far	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  EU	  fiscal	  governance,	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  (as	  a	  force	  for	  policy	  change)	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  effects	  on	  health.	  Our	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  architecture	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  EU	  policies.	  That	  should	  not	  obscure	  two	  facts.	  First,	  the	  bulk	  of	  austerity	  policies	  have	  been	  enacted	  by	  governments,	  not	  at	  the	  specific	  behest	  of	  the	  EU.	  This	  translates	  to	  a	  problem	  of	  overdetermination:	  if	  a	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government	  that	  seeks	  austere	  policies	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  EU	  austerity	  rules,	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  austerity	  in	  most	  rich	  countries,	  and	  amidst	  rising	  deficits	  or	  debt,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  determine	  just	  what	  caused	  the	  austerity	  policies.	  In	  at	  least	  one	  case-­‐	  Latvia	  4-­‐	  the	  EU	  restrained	  a	  right-­‐wing	  and	  ethnically	  exclusivist	  government	  5	  from	  its	  preferred	  policies,	  obliging	  it	  to	  make	  smaller	  cutbacks	  than	  the	  Latvian	  government	  sought.	  Nor	  should	  it	  obscure	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis	  itself	  on	  health,	  through	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  unemployment	  6.	  	  	   Second,	  the	  EU	  is	  largely	  governed	  by	  center-­‐right	  politicians	  and	  has	  been	  so	  throughout	  the	  crisis.	  A	  majority	  of	  the	  member	  states	  in	  the	  Council,	  a	  plurality	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  Commissioners	  (who	  are	  selected	  by	  member	  states	  and	  ratified	  by	  the	  Parliament)	  are	  all	  of	  the	  right.	  We	  should	  normatively	  and	  empirically	  expect	  policies	  of	  the	  right	  rather	  than	  the	  left.	  The	  legislation	  and	  treaty	  that	  constitute	  the	  new	  system	  of	  fiscal	  governance,	  discussed	  below,	  were	  political	  choices	  by	  European	  leaders	  that	  could	  have	  been	  made	  differently	  (and	  who	  also	  proved	  themselves	  quite	  capable	  of	  ignoring	  Commission	  proposals)7.	  	  	   Europe’s	  elected	  leaders	  have,	  however,	  voted	  to	  constrain	  their	  successors	  in	  both	  broad	  economic	  and	  social	  policy,	  and	  in	  health	  policies.	  They	  have	  constructed	  a	  regime	  that	  is	  deliberately	  “hard”,	  with	  automatic	  mechanisms	  to	  identify	  deviations	  from	  their	  preferred	  economic	  and	  social	  policies,	  elaborate	  surveillance	  and	  policy	  prescription	  that	  extends	  to	  healthcare,	  and	  legal	  consequences	  on	  the	  European	  and	  domestic	  levels	  for	  future	  member	  states	  that	  choose	  a	  different	  path.	  The	  EU	  might	  show	  its	  democracy	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  bound	  its	  member	  states	  for	  the	  future,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  constraining	  the	  future	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options	  of	  its	  leaders.	  In	  the	  future,	  the	  EU	  will	  have	  a	  major	  role	  in	  health	  policy	  in	  pursuit	  of	  low	  deficits	  and	  debt,	  best	  described	  as	  austerity	  economics	  8.	  	  
2.	  Fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  EU	  	  The	  European	  Union	  has	  long	  been	  a	  primarily	  economic	  project,	  developing	  political	  unity	  through	  economic	  unity.	  This	  bias	  towards	  economic	  integration,	  repeatedly	  agreed	  or	  accepted	  by	  member	  states	  and	  politicians	  over	  decades,	  produced	  a	  characteristic	  “constitutional	  asymmetry”	  in	  which	  market-­‐making,	  and	  the	  regulation	  and	  deregulation	  of	  European	  markets,	  was	  legally	  and	  politically	  easier	  than	  creation	  of	  compensatory	  mechanisms	  for	  redistribution	  9.	  With	  the	  drive	  to	  monetary	  union,	  member	  state	  governments	  began	  to	  see	  greater	  needs	  to	  coordinate	  their	  fiscal	  and	  public	  policies	  so	  that	  one	  state	  could	  not	  destabilize	  broader	  European	  markets.	  The	  EU	  adopted	  a	  regulatory	  approach,	  using	  a	  set	  of	  harder	  and	  softer	  legal	  mechanisms	  to	  (in	  theory)	  prevent	  and	  punish	  imprudent	  governments.	  As	  the	  financial	  crisis	  showed,	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  flawed	  in	  themselves,	  as	  disciplinary	  instruments,	  and	  in	  their	  functionality,	  as	  mechanisms	  to	  prevent	  economic	  crisis.	  	  
Prehistory:	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  before	  the	  crisis	  	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  draws	  on	  an	  approach	  and	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  have	  been	  established	  over	  decades	  10,	  11.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  economic	  and	  monetary	  integration	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1970s	  when	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  monetary	  system	  led	  to	  currencies	  floating	  against	  each	  other	  and	  countervailing	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efforts	  by	  European	  policymakers	  to	  increase	  the	  predictability	  of	  exchange	  rates.	  Given	  that	  exchange	  rates	  reflect	  real	  differences	  in	  economies,	  reducing	  the	  variability	  in	  exchange	  rates	  reduces	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  monetary	  system	  to	  cope	  with	  variability	  in	  states’	  economies-­‐	  including	  their	  business	  cycles,	  inflation	  rates,	  and	  fiscal	  policies.	  	  	   Within	  most	  modern	  states,	  the	  loss	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  is	  compensated	  by	  a	  welfare	  state	  that	  redistributes	  resources	  towards	  people	  and	  regions	  whose	  economic	  prospects	  are	  weak.	  But	  the	  EU	  has	  no	  serious	  redistributive	  mechanism	  between	  states.	  Its	  budget,	  most	  of	  which	  comes	  from	  value	  added	  taxes,	  is	  capped	  by	  the	  member	  states	  at	  about	  1%	  of	  EU	  GDP,	  while	  EU	  countries	  spend	  an	  average	  of	  8.3%	  on	  healthcare	  alone.	  Much	  of	  the	  EU	  budget	  is	  then	  spent	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  only	  weakly	  redistributive,	  such	  as	  agricultural	  policy,	  or	  constitute	  infrastructure	  investments	  in	  poorer	  regions	  that	  are	  helpful	  but	  resemble	  a	  redistributive	  welfare	  state	  in	  neither	  quantity	  nor	  kind.	  At	  no	  point	  have	  member	  states	  seriously	  agreed	  on	  greater	  redistribution.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  adjustment	  to	  any	  currency	  union	  must	  be	  born	  through	  some	  kind	  of	  internal	  mechanism	  such	  as	  lower	  wages	  and	  public	  expenditure.	  	  	   In	  theory,	  one	  way	  to	  avoid	  financial	  or	  economic	  crisis	  in	  a	  currency	  union	  is	  to	  forestall	  it	  by	  having	  similar	  economies	  with	  similar	  fiscal	  policies	  that	  avoid	  debt	  and	  thereby,	  in	  theory,	  reduce	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  shocks.	  Countries	  with	  limited	  debt	  are	  in	  principle	  less	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  financing	  crisis,	  and	  in	  the	  2008-­‐	  crisis	  have	  reacted	  with	  more	  impressive	  measures	  to	  preserve	  employment	  and	  welfare.	  The	  logic	  of	  monetary	  and	  economic	  union	  without	  redistribution	  might	  suggest	  a	  very	  prudent	  fiscal	  policy	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  that	  means	  a	  set	  of	  institutional	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arrangements	  to	  monitor	  and	  constrain	  member	  state	  deficits	  and	  the	  policies	  that	  might	  create	  them	  	   The	  1992	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  in	  which	  most	  EU	  member	  states	  made	  the	  commitment	  to	  monetary	  union,	  built	  in	  mechanisms	  to	  police	  member	  state	  debts	  and	  deficits.	  Accession	  to	  the	  single	  currency	  required	  that	  member	  states	  have,	  among	  other	  indicators,	  deficits	  below	  3%	  of	  GDP	  and	  debt	  below	  60%	  of	  GDP.	  In	  theory,	  noncompliant	  states	  would	  not	  be	  admitted	  to	  the	  Euro.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  they	  agreed	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  the	  member	  states	  committed	  themselves	  to	  a	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  (SGP)	  that	  would	  enforce	  the	  same	  fiscal	  policies	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Eurozone12.	  	  Member	  states	  were	  obliged	  by	  the	  SGP	  to	  have	  standardized	  statistics,	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  European	  Commission	  to	  gauge	  their	  compliance;	  and	  then	  adhere	  to	  the	  3%	  deficit	  and	  60%	  debt	  targets.	  	  Flanking	  the	  SGP	  mechanism,	  which	  in	  theory	  was	  hard	  law	  with	  fines	  for	  noncompliant	  states,	  the	  EU	  started	  to	  build	  a	  machinery	  for	  developing	  social	  policy	  ideas	  and	  recommendations.	  This	  “soft	  law”	  machinery	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  SGP	  targets	  and	  the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  fiscal	  policy	  so	  that	  SGP	  breaches	  or	  economic	  distortion	  could	  be	  headed	  off.	  A	  mechanism	  called	  the	  “Broad	  Economic	  Policy	  Guidelines”	  (BEPG)	  brought	  member	  states	  and	  the	  Commission	  together	  to	  evaluate	  policies,	  ensuring	  in	  theory	  that	  there	  would	  be	  ex-­‐ante	  policing	  of	  expansionary	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ex-­‐post	  sanctions	  of	  the	  SGP.	  It	  certainly	  seemed	  weak.Notably,	  Ireland	  was	  formally	  reprimanded	  for	  procyclical	  policies	  but	  ignored	  the	  reprimand13	  while	  member	  states	  found	  various	  ways	  to	  water	  down	  its	  recommendations14.	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After	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  but	  before	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Euro	  in	  2000,	  member	  states	  of	  a	  more	  social	  democratic	  persuasion	  had	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  and	  wanted	  to	  put	  “social”	  concerns	  such	  as	  health	  and	  pensions	  onto	  the	  EU	  agenda	  with	  more	  equal	  footing	  to	  fiscal	  policy	  targets	  15.	  Their	  tool	  was	  the	  much-­‐studied	  and	  generally	  disappointing	  Open	  Method	  of	  Coordination	  (OMC),	  a	  process	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  and	  member	  states	  agree	  various	  social	  policy	  targets	  and	  monitor	  progress	  towards	  them16.	  While	  the	  OMC	  has	  had	  very	  limited	  and	  contingent	  effects	  on	  policy,	  it	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  EU’s	  expertise	  and	  confidence	  in	  making	  detailed	  recommendations	  on	  social	  policy.	  Between	  the	  BEPG,	  the	  OMC,	  and	  the	  surveillance	  activities	  of	  other	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  OECD	  and	  IMF,	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  library	  of	  potential,	  typically	  liberalizing,	  reform	  ideas	  for	  each	  member	  state.	  Many	  of	  them	  have	  been	  agreed	  with	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree	  of	  seriousness	  by	  the	  member	  state	  through	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  OMC	  and	  advisory	  committees	  such	  as	  the	  Economic	  Policy	  Committee	  and	  Social	  Protection	  Committee.	  This	  agreement	  authorizes	  the	  Commission	  and	  other	  bodies	  to	  start	  trying	  to	  expand	  and	  enforce	  commitments	  member	  states	  politicians	  might	  have	  regarded	  as	  inconsequential	  17.	  	  As	  it	  happened,	  many	  Eurozone	  member	  states	  were	  admitted	  to	  the	  Euro	  without	  adhering	  to	  Maastricht	  targets	  (progress	  toward	  them	  was	  declared	  sufficient)18.	  After	  the	  single	  currency	  started	  operation	  in	  2000,	  member	  states	  continued	  to	  violate	  the	  SGP.	  In	  2005,	  when	  the	  Commission	  threatened	  to	  start	  noncompliance	  proceedings	  against	  powerful	  France	  and	  Germany,	  the	  member	  states	  agreed	  to	  soften	  the	  SGP,	  expanding	  the	  “soft	  law”	  policy	  mechanism	  still	  more.	  Sanctions	  for	  SGP	  violations	  were	  made	  easier	  to	  evade,	  but	  soft	  law	  mechanisms	  for	  fiscal	  and	  policy	  surveillance	  were	  expanded	  19.	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The	  Eurozone	  saw	  a	  boom	  in	  many	  of	  its	  peripheral	  economies	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  largely	  because	  interest	  rates	  in	  peripheral	  economies	  (in	  central	  and	  eastern	  Europe	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Eurozone)	  dropped	  greatly.	  This	  allows	  banks	  in	  the	  somewhat	  stagnant	  core	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  to	  make	  loans	  to	  speculative	  developments	  in	  the	  more	  peripheral	  states.	  In	  turn,	  this	  “hot	  money”	  often	  distorted	  economies	  (the	  boom	  in	  Spanish	  construction	  sped	  up	  that	  country’s	  effective	  deindustrialization,	  for	  example)8.	  The	  influx	  of	  money	  also	  allowed	  Greece	  to	  continue	  its	  inegalitarian,	  expensive	  welfare	  path,	  with	  a	  segmented	  welfare	  state	  that	  lavished	  resources	  on	  some	  groups	  while	  producing	  broadly	  inegalitarian	  outcomes	  20.The	  budgets	  of	  peripheral	  states	  such	  as	  Ireland	  and	  Spain	  were,	  on	  paper,	  healthier	  and	  more	  austere	  in	  these	  years	  than	  Germany	  or	  France	  because	  they	  benefitted	  from	  booms	  fuelled	  by	  speculative	  inflows	  that	  the	  Eurozone	  enabled.	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  prehistory	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  is	  not	  a	  story	  of	  success.	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  required	  limited	  public	  debts	  and	  deficits	  for	  Eurozone	  accession,	  and	  the	  SGP	  required	  that	  member	  states,	  once	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  continue	  to	  adhere	  to	  those	  limits.	  The	  BEPG	  were	  supposed	  to	  coordinate	  policies	  to	  prevent	  SGP	  violations,	  but	  were	  not	  effective.	  In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  more	  Social	  Democratic	  governments	  added	  the	  Open	  Method	  of	  Coordination	  as	  a	  way	  to	  promote	  social	  policy	  goals	  and	  soften	  the	  SGP	  focus	  on	  deficits	  and	  debts.	  After	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  the	  SGP	  as	  well	  as	  the	  softer	  BEPG	  and	  OMC	  were	  broadly	  ineffective,	  and	  the	  SGP	  was	  notably	  rewritten	  to	  be	  softer	  when	  it	  was	  being	  violated	  by	  Germany	  and	  France.	  As	  of	  2008,	  then,	  there	  was	  not	  much	  reason	  to	  be	  impressed	  with	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  SGP	  and	  flanking	  soft	  law	  mechanisms	  that	  had	  been	  violated	  with	  impunity	  and	  had	  been	  rewritten	  to	  be	  less	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powerful.	  As	  the	  crisis	  would	  reveal,	  furthermore,	  speculative	  capital	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  Ireland	  and	  Spain	  to	  be	  compliant	  with	  the	  SGP,	  despite	  structural	  weaknesses,	  and	  the	  efforts	  to	  coordinate	  statistics	  had	  not	  prevented	  misrepresentation	  in	  Greece	  or	  other	  countries.	  Eurozone	  fiscal	  governance	  had	  not	  been	  obviously	  successful	  at	  preventing	  deficits	  or	  debts.	  	  	  
History:	  Financial	  crisis,	  fiscal	  crisis,	  political	  crisis	  	  Dependence	  on	  hot	  money	  and	  speculative	  projects	  is	  dangerous	  in	  a	  financial	  crisis	  such	  as	  began	  in	  2008;	  loss	  of	  bond-­‐buyers’	  faith	  in	  the	  solvency	  of	  banks,	  in	  particular,	  led	  to	  an	  abrupt	  economic	  stop	  that	  ripped	  through	  the	  economies	  of	  Europe	  21-­‐23.	  When	  European	  policymakers,	  notably	  the	  ECB	  and	  Germany,	  refused	  to	  say	  that	  they	  would	  support	  Eurozone	  member	  states	  in	  trouble,	  market	  players	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  bet	  against	  the	  debt	  of	  such	  countries	  and	  financial	  institutions	  exposed	  to	  them.	  Early	  in	  the	  crisis,	  a	  firm	  statement	  of	  support	  from	  key	  policymakers	  could	  probably	  have	  prevented	  all	  subsequent	  developments,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  risk	  creation	  of	  an	  ineffective	  (“soft”)	  budget	  constraint,	  and	  let	  the	  weakest	  peripheral	  economy,	  Greece,	  face	  increasingly	  difficult	  government	  debt	  markets	  24.	  The	  result	  was	  an	  investment	  strike	  against	  government	  debt	  in	  much	  of	  the	  EU	  periphery,	  with	  governments	  finding	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  sell	  their	  debt.	  	  	   Greece,	  then	  Ireland,	  Portugal,	  and	  Cyprus	  entered	  a	  form	  of	  receivership	  in	  relatively	  short	  order,	  with	  their	  European	  Union	  partners	  forcing	  them	  into	  receivership	  even	  when	  markets	  had	  not	  obviously	  done	  so	  (as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Ireland	  and	  Cyprus).	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Behind	  them	  was	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  run	  on	  Spanish	  or	  Italian	  government	  debt,	  which	  threatened	  the	  whole	  Eurozone.	  Receivership	  meant	  conditional	  loans	  supervised	  by	  an	  	  improvised	  “Troika”	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  and	  composed	  of	  the	  European	  Commission,	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB),	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  with	  no	  obvious	  base	  in	  the	  European	  treaties.	  The	  participation	  of	  the	  ECB,	  in	  particular,	  was	  striking;	  there	  was	  nothing	  in	  the	  EU	  treaties,	  or	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  central	  banking,	  that	  suggests	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  central	  bank	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  detailed	  fiscal	  and	  public	  policymaking.	  	  Member	  states	  in	  crisis	  that	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  such	  as	  Latvia	  and	  Hungary,	  were	  subject	  to	  joint	  intervention	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  European	  Commission	  (“Balance	  of	  Payments	  programmes”).	  	  	   The	  Troika’s	  main	  tool	  for	  containing	  the	  crisis	  (before	  it	  hit	  Italy	  and	  Spain),	  was	  well	  known	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  international	  financial	  institutions:	  conditional	  lending.	  Conditional	  lending	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  managing	  the	  risk	  of	  soft	  budget	  constraints	  while	  maximizing	  lender	  influence	  over	  countries’	  policies	  and	  fiscal	  choices.	  In	  conditional	  lending,	  the	  loan	  is	  divided	  into	  “tranches”	  which	  are	  contingent	  on	  the	  recipient	  state	  carrying	  out	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  reforms	  (called	  “Economic	  Adjustment	  Programmes,”	  EAPs)	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  make	  the	  recipient	  state’s	  economy	  more	  sustainable.	  The	  loans	  from	  the	  Troika	  to	  Cyprus,	  Greece,	  Ireland,	  and	  Portugal	  were	  far	  larger	  than	  debtor	  states	  normally	  receive	  from	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  reflecting	  the	  risk	  to	  other	  Eurozone	  countries’	  banks	  and	  economies.	  	  The	  EAPs	  contain	  broad	  fiscal	  objectives	  as	  well	  as	  somewhat	  softer	  advice.	  The	  broad	  fiscal	  objectives	  are	  mostly	  about	  reducing	  government	  deficits-­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  through	  budget	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases.	  The	  policy	  contents	  of	  the	  EAPs	  are	  substantial	  and	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directive	  and	  often	  reflect	  on	  health	  policy	  25,	  which	  seems	  reasonable	  given	  that	  the	  health	  sector	  is	  one	  with	  substantial	  fraud	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  pharmaceuticals,	  purchasing,	  and	  informal	  payments	  26	  as	  well	  as	  the	  kinds	  of	  waste	  studied	  by	  health	  economists	  and	  health	  services	  researchers.	  The	  second	  (2012)	  Greek	  EAP,	  in	  particular,	  focuses	  on	  reforming	  the	  healthcare	  sector,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  problems	  discovered	  in	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  during	  the	  efforts	  to	  implement	  the	  first,	  2010,	  EAP	  27.	  They	  include,	  to	  take	  the	  Greek	  case	  as	  an	  example,	  concentration	  of	  responsibilities	  for	  health	  in	  the	  health	  ministry,	  installation	  of	  an	  e-­‐prescription	  system	  (in	  part	  to	  reduce	  fraud),	  introduce	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  in	  hospitals	  (!),	  increased	  transparency	  about	  performance	  and	  finances	  including	  audits,	  and	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  pharmaceutical	  expenditure	  such	  as	  introduction	  of	  generic	  substitution.	  Measures	  such	  as	  the	  labor	  market	  liberalization	  that	  all	  EAPs	  recommend	  also	  would	  influence	  the	  conditions	  of	  health	  sector	  workers.	  For	  example,	  the	  public	  sector	  headcount	  reduction’s	  effects	  were	  important	  in	  the	  case	  of	  doctors	  who	  quit	  the	  public	  sector	  rather	  than	  accept	  full-­‐time	  public	  sector	  employment	  28.	  In	  Cyprus,	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  actually	  contain	  provisions	  that	  are	  somewhat	  progressive,	  since	  they	  in	  principle	  urge	  Cyprus	  to	  retrench	  its	  existing	  fragmented	  system	  while	  expanding	  financial	  access	  29,	  30.	  	  The	  record	  of	  conditional	  loans	  in	  promoting	  this	  kind	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  has	  been	  extensively	  studied	  in	  the	  several	  decades	  when	  they	  have	  been	  widely	  used,	  and	  is	  not	  good	  31.	  One	  literature	  review	  found	  that	  effects	  on	  growth	  are	  small	  on	  average,	  they	  are	  damaging	  for	  weaker	  groups	  in	  society,	  they	  tend	  not	  to	  damage	  corrupt	  elites,	  and	  they	  face	  unexpected	  consequences	  and	  major	  implementation	  problems	  32.	  	  The	  IMF’s	  own	  review	  of	  the	  Greek	  lending	  program	  seems	  to	  show	  these	  results	  33,	  though	  the	  Troika	  has	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forced	  changes	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  healthcare	  in	  Greece	  and	  the	  other	  peripheral	  states	  
34.	   Meanwhile,	  the	  states	  under	  the	  Troika	  have	  mostly	  fulfilled	  the	  core	  economic	  targets	  of	  reduced	  deficits,	  though	  shrinking	  or	  stagnant	  economies	  mean	  that	  their	  debt:GDP	  ratios	  are	  still	  generally	  getting	  higher.	  Fulfilling	  these	  targets	  does	  not	  occur	  through	  the	  relatively	  nuanced	  policies	  in	  the	  EAPs	  such	  as	  generic	  substitution	  or	  ministerial	  reorganization	  so	  much	  as	  through	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  public	  finances	  such	  as	  budget	  cuts,	  reductions	  in	  the	  list	  of	  covered	  services,	  pension	  cuts,	  staff	  cuts,	  claw-­‐backs,	  or	  revenue	  measures	  such	  as	  higher	  taxes	  or	  user	  fees.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  reason,	  for	  the	  upheaval	  in	  the	  health	  services	  of	  the	  peripheral	  Eurozone.	  Any	  benefits	  of	  efficiency	  measures	  have	  been	  overwhelmed,	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  by	  the	  organizational	  and	  health	  access	  consequences	  of	  budget	  cuts	  (the	  IMF,	  in	  fact,	  is	  promoting	  restoration	  of	  some	  budgets	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  communicable	  diseases	  and	  improve	  health	  access	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  impoverished)28.	  	  	  
Shaping	  the	  future?:	  	  strengthening	  fiscal	  governance	  	  There	  might	  have	  been	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  understand	  and	  frame	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  but	  the	  one	  that	  Europe’s	  key	  elites	  settled	  on	  focused	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  soft	  budget	  constraint-­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  argument	  that	  states	  would	  pursue	  imprudent	  fiscal	  policies	  if	  they	  expected	  a	  future	  bailout.	  “Creditor”	  countries,	  led	  by	  Germany	  but	  also	  including	  states	  such	  as	  Finland	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  adopted	  the	  position	  that	  the	  Troika	  bailouts,	  and	  any	  future	  hope	  of	  a	  bailout,	  would	  have	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  very	  strict	  and	  punitive	  measures	  that	  would	  prevent	  states	  spending	  irresponsibly.	  The	  political	  bargain,	  as	  seen	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especially	  from	  leading	  creditor	  country	  Germany,	  is	  that	  the	  bailouts	  and	  other	  irregular	  behavior	  during	  the	  crisis	  must	  not	  become	  a	  precedent,	  and	  the	  route	  to	  achieve	  this	  is	  a	  redoubled	  commitment	  to	  balanced	  budgets.	  	  	   The	  result	  was	  the	  new	  architecture	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  EU,	  which	  involves	  legislation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  whole	  new	  treaty	  that	  obliges	  signatory	  states	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  SGP	  and	  even	  make	  it	  part	  of	  their	  domestic	  constitutional	  law.	  	  The	  next	  section,	  3,	  discusses	  the	  architecture	  of	  this	  fiscal	  governance	  system,	  and	  section	  4	  discusses	  its	  most	  specific	  form	  of	  policy	  advice,	  the	  European	  Semester.	  	  The	  Commission	  Staff	  Working	  Paper	  on	  the	  Semester	  as	  a	  whole	  for	  2014	  (SWD(2014)	  401),	  summarizing	  the	  agenda	  for	  policy	  reform,	  gives	  a	  particularly	  striking	  presentation	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  policymaking	  in	  EU	  fiscal	  policy.	  After	  noting	  deterioration	  in	  a	  range	  of	  social	  statistics,	  including	  unemployment	  and	  risk	  of	  poverty,	  and	  spelling	  out	  some	  of	  the	  links	  between	  poverty,	  health,	  education,	  and	  generally	  blighted	  life	  chances,	  it	  continues:	  “In	  mitigating	  these	  challenges	  for	  the	  well-­‐functioning	  of	  the	  euro	  area,	  ambitious	  implementation	  of	  structural	  reforms	  leading	  to	  a	  more	  flexible	  economy	  are	  key.	  Structural	  reforms	  cannot	  only	  contribute	  to	  a	  durable	  rebalancing	  process,	  but	  also	  attenuate	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  households'	  deleveraging:	  stronger	  real	  wage	  adjustment	  leads	  to	  a	  smoother	  reaction	  of	  employment	  and,	  consequently,	  of	  real	  output,	  while	  a	  faster	  adjustment	  in	  prices	  allows	  for	  an	  also	  faster	  adjustment	  in	  the	  real	  interest	  rate	  towards	  the	  equilibrium	  level.”	  (p.9)	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The	  prose	  is	  not	  very	  clear,	  but	  in	  short	  the	  solution	  to	  a	  deteriorating	  social	  situation	  marked	  by	  low	  incomes	  and	  unemployment	  is	  adoption	  of	  “structural	  reforms”	  (basically	  labor	  market	  liberalization)	  whose	  objective	  is	  to	  enable	  lower	  wages	  (“stronger	  real	  wage	  adjustment”)	  and	  raise	  unemployment	  (“smoother	  reaction	  of	  employment”),	  risking	  deflation	  (“faster	  adjustment	  in	  prices”	  and	  “real	  output”)	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  an	  “equilibrium	  real	  interest	  rate”.	  	   This	  is	  austerity	  economics	  with	  a	  vengeance	  8.	  	  The	  goal,	  an	  equilibrium	  real	  exchange	  rate,	  is	  a	  fiction	  confined	  to	  limited	  economic	  models,	  but	  the	  policy	  objectives	  justified	  by	  the	  goal	  are	  concrete:	  unemployment	  and	  lower	  wages	  for	  many.	  Apparently	  the	  theory	  is	  that	  once	  wages	  are	  lower	  and	  employment	  higher,	  the	  economy	  will	  be	  durably	  rebalanced	  and	  therefore	  able	  to	  grow	  again,	  and	  that	  will	  in	  turn	  improve	  the	  dire	  social	  statistics	  the	  Commission	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph.	  But	  in	  the	  mean	  time,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  unemployment	  and	  poverty	  is	  policy	  that	  enables	  more	  unemployment	  and	  poverty.	  	  This	  argument,	  with	  its	  obvious	  distributional	  implications	  has	  a	  long	  and	  contested	  history	  in	  politics	  and	  economics.	  It	  has	  now	  been	  entrenched	  in	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  of	  the	  EU,	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  and	  elsewhere	  34,	  35.	  	  
3.	  On	  paper:	  the	  architecture	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  	  Given	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  lie	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  financial	  crisis,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  focus	  and	  justification	  of	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  is	  the	  policy	  objective	  of	  3%	  deficits	  and	  a	  60%	  debt:	  GDP	  ratio.	  Health	  systems	  and	  broader	  policy	  determinants	  of	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health	  are	  important	  in	  this	  framework	  because	  of	  their	  budgetary	  implications.	  Furthermore,	  if	  objectives	  are	  fiscal,	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  given	  policy	  is	  a	  necessary	  investment	  is	  relatively	  hard	  to	  make;	  the	  costs	  are	  clear	  and	  on-­‐budget,	  while	  the	  benefits	  are	  more	  speculative	  36.	   	  	   The	  EU’s	  reformed	  fiscal	  governance	  architecture	  does	  four	  things:	  i)	  promotes	  greater	  harmonization	  among	  states	  regarding	  the	  goals,	  methods,	  and	  schedules	  used	  in	  planning	  their	  national	  budgets,	  ii)	  builds	  on	  deficit	  and	  debt	  rules	  to	  allow	  broader	  ‘macroeconomic	  imbalances’	  to	  be	  addressed,	  iii)	  broadens	  and	  deepens	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  central	  EU	  institutions	  and	  third	  party	  organizations	  (such	  as	  the	  IMF)	  to	  conduct	  surveillance,	  and	  iv)	  strengthens	  penalties	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  In	  2011,	  the	  EU	  passed	  five	  regulations	  and	  one	  directive,	  collectively	  known	  as	  the	  ‘six-­‐pack’,	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  SGP’s	  perceived	  weaknesses	  (see	  Table	  1).	  The	  six-­‐pack	  ties	  states	  to	  Medium	  Term	  Objectives	  (MTOs),	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  state’s	  structural	  budget	  balance	  (European	  Commission	  2013).	  The	  six-­‐pack	  defines	  what	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  deviation	  from	  an	  MTO,	  and	  sets	  out	  what	  should	  happen	  if	  a	  state	  strays	  from	  that	  path.	  The	  regulations	  contain	  strong	  sanctions	  for	  states	  that	  are	  non-­‐compliant	  with	  recommendations	  under	  the	  Excessive	  Deficit	  Procedure	  (European	  Commission	  2014:	  4),	  which,	  despite	  its	  name,	  is	  now	  used	  to	  enforce	  compliance	  with	  both	  debt	  and	  deficit	  rules.	  Non-­‐compliance	  can	  result	  in	  annual	  fines	  or	  suspension	  of	  Cohesion	  Fund	  financing	  for	  projects	  such	  as	  infrastructure.	  	   The	  final	  two	  regulations	  in	  the	  six-­‐pack	  broaden	  the	  SGP	  considerably,	  extending	  the	  norms	  underlying	  the	  debt	  and	  deficit	  rules	  to	  many	  other	  potential	  areas	  of	  policy.	  The	  Macroeconomic	  Imbalance	  Procedure	  (MIP)	  covers	  “any	  trend	  giving	  rise	  to	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macroeconomic	  developments	  which	  are	  adversely	  affecting,	  or	  have	  the	  potential	  adversely	  to	  affect,	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  or	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  monetary	  union,	  or	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole”.	  The	  MIP	  allows	  the	  Commission	  to	  conduct	  more	  extensive	  surveillance	  of	  states	  and	  publish	  recommendations	  about	  how	  to	  address	  imbalances.	  States	  with	  excessive	  imbalances	  must	  respond	  by	  formulating	  Corrective	  Action	  Plans	  in	  which	  they	  describe	  the	  policy	  actions	  they	  will	  take	  to	  address	  the	  imbalances	  identified.	  Failing	  to	  submit	  an	  acceptable	  CAP	  or	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  implementation	  can	  result	  in	  penalties.	  Aspects	  of	  both	  the	  EDP	  and	  MIP	  are	  decided	  by	  Reverse	  QMV,	  meaning	  that	  unless	  a	  qualified	  majority	  of	  the	  Council	  votes	  against	  a	  penalty	  within	  a	  certain	  time	  period,	  it	  is	  imposed	  automatically.	  	  Table	  1:	  Reforming	  the	  EU’s	  Fiscal	  Governance	  Architecture	  	  Year	   Policy	   Effect	  2011	   The	  Six-­‐Pack	  • Regulation	  (EU)	  1173/2011	  
• Regulation	  (EU)	  1174/2011	  
• Regulation	  (EU)	  1175/2011	  
• Regulation	  (EU)	  1176/2011	  	  
• Council	  Regulation	  (EU)	  
Strengthen	  the	  SGP	  
• Compliance	  with	  and	  enforcement	  of	  SGP	  rules.	  
• Correct	  excessive	  macroeconomic	  imbalances.	  
• Multilateral	  surveillance	  via	  European	  Semester.	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1177/2011	  	  
• Council	  Directive	  2011/85/EU	  
• Define	  scope	  of	  Macroeconomic	  Imbalance	  Procedure.	  
• Boost	  corrective	  arm	  of	  SGP	  via	  Excessive	  Deficit	  Procedure.	  
• Harmonize	  ways	  in	  which	  states	  (except	  UK)	  plan	  and	  publish	  budgets.	  	  2012	   Treaty	  on	  Stability,	  Coordination,	  and	  Governance	  
• Non-­‐EU	  international	  treaty	  signed	  by	  25	  EU	  member	  states.	  
Ensure	  tougher	  fiscal	  discipline	  
• Require	  states	  to	  converge	  on	  MTOs.	  
• Require	  states	  to	  maintain	  lower	  deficit	  ceiling	  than	  under	  SGP.	  
• Require	  states	  to	  transpose	  commitments	  into	  national	  law	  of	  a	  “binding	  force	  and	  permanent	  character,	  preferably	  constitutional”.	  
• CJEU	  can	  issue	  financial	  sanctions	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  	  2013	   The	  Two-­‐Pack	  • Regulation	  472/2013	  	  
• Regulation	  (EU)	  473/2013	  
Formalize	  ad	  hoc	  fiscal	  governance	  arrangements	  
• Increase	  surveillance	  for	  financially	  unstable	  states,	  broaden	  information	  base	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   for	  surveillance.	  
• Add	  common	  timeline	  to	  European	  Semester,	  acknowledge	  the	  TSCG.	  	  	   But	  the	  six-­‐pack	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  for	  some	  states.	  The	  Treaty	  on	  Stability,	  Coordination,	  and	  Governance	  contains	  elements	  originally	  intended	  to	  be	  part	  of	  EU	  law,	  but	  opposition	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  Czech	  Republic	  forced	  policymakers	  to	  conclude	  the	  treaty	  outside	  of	  EU	  frameworks.	  The	  treaty	  requires	  member	  states	  to	  adhere	  to	  tougher	  deficit	  standards	  than	  under	  the	  SGP,	  and	  requires	  them	  to	  transpose	  their	  commitments	  to	  fiscal	  discipline	  into	  national	  law	  of	  a	  ‘binding	  force	  and	  permanent	  character,	  preferably	  constitutional’.	  To	  deal	  with	  this	  unexpected	  failure	  to	  integrate	  the	  Treaty	  into	  EU	  law,	  the	  EU	  passed	  two	  more	  regulations	  in	  2013	  known	  as	  the	  ‘two-­‐pack’,	  designed	  to	  formalize	  and	  consolidate	  some	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  procedures	  developed	  during	  the	  crisis	  and	  acknowledge	  the	  TSCG	  within	  EU	  law.	  These	  regulations	  strengthen	  the	  ‘European	  Semester’	  a	  common	  annual	  cycle	  of	  review,	  recommendation,	  and	  adjustment,	  that	  promotes	  greater	  harmonization	  among	  member	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  budgetary	  planning	  and	  agenda	  setting	  (see	  below),	  and	  formalize	  a	  number	  of	  procedures	  for	  dealing	  with	  states	  in	  crisis.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  reforms	  constitute	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  welfare	  states	  in	  the	  EU	  as	  they	  currently	  exist.	  In	  future	  years,	  the	  EU’s	  rising	  healthcare	  costs,	  significant	  pension	  obligations,	  and	  ageing	  population-­‐	  and	  any	  government	  interested	  in	  expenditure-­‐	  are	  likely	  to	  collide	  with	  the	  blunt	  instrument	  of	  its	  fiscal	  governance	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architecture.	  These	  governance	  structures	  do	  not	  address	  income	  inequality,	  redistribution	  or	  policy	  goals	  such	  as	  healthy	  populations.	  Although	  the	  EU	  is	  reshaping	  itself	  fiscally,	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  how	  this	  increased	  fiscal	  discipline	  will	  impact	  safety	  nets	  across	  Europe.	  	  	  
4.	  The	  European	  Semester	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  EU	  competencies	  	  Since	  at	  least	  the	  late	  1990s	  the	  EU	  effect	  on	  healthcare	  systems	  was	  framed	  almost	  uniquely	  as	  an	  application	  of	  its	  general	  economic	  legislation	  to	  health	  care34,	  37.	  	  While	  the	  OMC,	  BEPG,	  and	  lesser	  forms	  of	  international	  exchange	  all	  aspired	  to	  influence	  member	  state	  health	  policies,	  they	  were	  very	  soft	  forms	  of	  law	  that	  worked	  only	  when	  they	  had	  allies	  within	  the	  member	  states	  who	  were	  able	  to	  use	  them	  in	  domestic	  politics	  38.	  	  The	  European	  Semester	  of	  economic	  policy	  coordination	  refers	  to	  an	  ongoing	  cycle	  of	  reviews	  and	  recommendations	  that	  brings	  together	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  fiscal	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  governance	  architecture	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  First	  implemented	  in	  2011,	  the	  European	  Semester	  is	  a	  mechanism	  designed	  to	  ensure	  both	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  coordination	  –	  not	  just	  among	  member	  states	  or	  between	  member	  states	  and	  the	  central	  EU	  institutions,	  but	  also	  across	  policy	  areas.	  	  	   The	  Semester	  extends	  the	  logic	  of	  fiscal	  governance.	  In	  theory	  it	  pre-­‐empts	  economic	  crisis	  by	  shaping	  member	  states	  policies	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  imbalances	  and	  expenditure	  beyond	  SGP	  limits.	  It	  should	  both	  prevent	  policies	  that	  threaten	  progress	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towards	  SGP	  compliance,	  and	  develop	  policies	  that	  address	  wasteful	  areas	  of	  expenditure	  that,	  left	  unchanged,	  would	  threaten	  SGP	  compliance.	  	  	   The	  Semester	  starts	  in	  November	  with	  the	  publication	  by	  the	  Commission	  of	  an	  Annual	  Growth	  Survey,	  which	  sets	  out	  priorities	  for	  increasing	  growth	  and	  employment	  over	  the	  next	  year.	  The	  European	  Parliament	  has	  one	  of	  its	  rare	  opportunities	  to	  intervene	  when	  it	  and	  the	  Council	  discuss	  the	  Survey	  over	  the	  next	  months.	  The	  Spring	  meeting	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  (heads	  of	  state)	  then	  specifies	  challenges	  and	  policy	  directions.	  Member	  states	  then	  send	  their	  National	  Reform	  Programmes	  containing	  national	  economic	  plans	  and	  Stability/Convergence	  Plans,	  which	  outline	  their	  medium-­‐term	  budget	  plans,	  to	  the	  European	  Commission.	  It	  evaluates	  them	  and	  then	  issues	  draft	  Country	  Specific	  Recommendations,	  finally	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  in	  June	  or	  July.	  These	  CSRs	  are	  the	  core	  of	  the	  process,	  giving	  specific	  advice	  on	  policies.	  Member	  states	  in	  a	  financial	  assistance	  mechanism	  (BoP	  programme	  or	  EAP)	  are	  under	  much	  more	  intense	  surveillance	  and	  are	  not	  subjected	  to	  the	  normal	  Semester	  process.	  	  	   	  The	  process	  is,	  in	  law	  and	  in	  practice,	  mainly	  focused	  on	  austere	  fiscal	  objectives.	  In	  law,	  the	  Annual	  Growth	  Survey	  is	  focused	  on	  jobs	  and	  economic	  growth,	  and	  frames	  the	  national	  plans	  and	  the	  CSRs	  in	  terms	  of	  contribution	  to	  the	  SGP,	  prevention	  of	  Macroeconomic	  imbalances	  (through	  the	  Macroeconomic	  Imbalance	  Procedure),	  and	  the	  “Europe	  2020”	  strategic	  objectives	  of	  jobs	  and	  economic	  growth.	  The	  formal	  process	  also	  includes	  minimal	  opportunities	  for	  civil	  society	  and	  legislatures,	  including	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  to	  have	  input;	  this	  might	  not	  be	  a	  big	  change	  for	  some	  member	  states	  with	  traditionally	  weak	  legislatures,	  but	  is	  a	  big	  change	  for	  states	  with	  traditions	  of	  strong	  parliaments	  or	  minority	  governments	  (in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  stable	  parliamentary	  coalition	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to	  support	  the	  government).	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  big	  change	  from	  earlier	  soft	  law	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  OMC	  which	  were	  supposed	  to	  incorporate	  civil	  society;	  the	  Semester	  is	  legitimated	  by	  fiscal	  policy,	  not	  better	  policy	  or	  legitimation	  through	  participation.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  in	  principle	  a	  unique	  body,	  one	  sectoral	  Council	  configuration	  (e.g.	  of	  health	  ministers)	  is	  in	  principle	  unable	  to	  intervene	  on	  a	  decision	  of	  another	  Council	  configuration	  (e.g.	  of	  finance	  ministers).	  As	  a	  result,	  health	  ministers	  can	  only	  make	  broad	  comments	  about	  their	  preferred	  approach	  to	  health	  policy	  and	  not	  directly	  intervene	  in	  the	  Semester	  
39.	  	  	  	   The	  process	  has	  been	  firmly	  controlled	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  and	  within	  the	  Commission,	  DG	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  (ECFIN).	  Since	  the	  2014	  appointment	  of	  the	  new	  and	  more	  right-­‐wing	  Juncker	  Commission,	  ECFIN	  has	  been	  led	  by	  a	  French	  Socialist,	  and	  so	  the	  Secretariat	  General,	  under	  President	  Juncker’s	  control,	  has	  been	  taking	  more	  of	  a	  role	  at	  ECFIN’s	  expense.	  The	  Commission	  is	  acting	  here	  as	  the	  effective	  secretariat	  to	  a	  broad	  creditor	  coalition	  of	  member	  states.	  There	  are	  few	  indications	  of	  a	  member	  state	  having	  successfully	  “uploaded”	  its	  preferences	  for	  a	  health	  CSR	  to	  the	  Commission,	  though	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  similarity	  between	  Austrian	  CSRs	  and	  its	  government’s	  reform	  agendas.	  This	  is	  important.	  The	  EU	  is	  not	  merely	  validating	  the	  preferences	  of	  domestic	  actors,	  as	  frequently	  happened	  with	  earlier	  soft	  law	  processes.	  Healthcare	  expertise	  and	  interests	  are	  at	  two	  removes	  from	  the	  process:	  The	  broad	  social	  DG	  Employment	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  social	  policy	  recommendations,	  including	  on	  health.	  The	  small	  DG	  responsible	  for	  health	  is	  only	  involved	  in	  the	  preparatory	  process,	  providing	  expert	  input.	  Neither	  DG	  has	  any	  obligation	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  health	  DG.	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   The	  austerity	  focus	  is	  more	  important	  by	  member	  states	  that	  receive	  a	  CSR	  with	  a	  legal	  basis	  in	  the	  Macroeconomic	  Imbalance	  Procedure,	  which	  can	  trigger	  coercive	  responses	  (see	  the	  section	  above).	  An	  increasing	  number	  of	  health	  CSRs	  have	  this	  legal	  basis.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  this	  basis	  is	  determined	  or	  what	  it	  will	  mean	  in	  practice,	  but	  it	  clearly	  links	  health	  policy	  CSRs	  to	  the	  important	  fiscal	  policy	  mechanisms.	  	  	   As	  with	  much	  of	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  system,	  the	  policies	  are	  designed	  to	  limit	  political	  discretion.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Commission	  does	  have	  discretion	  and	  has	  used	  it;	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  first	  CSRs	  it	  tended	  not	  to	  issue	  CSRs	  for	  both	  health	  and	  long	  term	  care	  if	  one	  demanded	  major	  policy	  change,	  and	  it	  was	  less	  likely	  to	  request	  health	  system	  reforms	  of	  states	  that	  opted	  out	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  with	  low	  political	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  (e.g.	  the	  UK).	  Member	  states	  that	  used	  the	  Semester	  to	  announce	  themselves	  major	  healthcare	  reforms	  did	  not	  receive	  recommendations	  in	  that	  year.	  	  Over	  time,	  however,	  the	  CSRs	  are	  extending	  to	  most	  states	  for	  both	  healthcare	  and	  long-­‐term	  care.	  	  	   The	  healthcare	  recommendations	  are	  mostly	  quite	  generic.	  They	  urge	  to	  enhance	  the	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  public	  spending	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  reduction	  of	  pharmaceutical	  expenditure,	  and	  lower	  hospital	  expenditure	  through	  better	  out-­‐patient,	  primary,	  preventative	  care	  and	  better	  coordinating	  and	  integrating	  care	  delivery.	  They	  tend	  to	  suggest	  structural	  reforms,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  budgetary	  effects	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  longer-­‐term.	  So	  long	  as	  they	  are	  generic	  and	  sound	  like	  many	  international	  suggestions	  for	  health	  reform	  (e.g.	  the	  OECD),	  member	  states	  have	  a	  relatively	  easy	  time	  claiming	  compliance.	  Many	  health	  ministries	  and	  experts,	  formally	  excluded	  from	  most	  of	  the	  Semester	  process,	  are	  also	  “lying	  low,”	  preferring	  not	  to	  educate	  DG	  ECFIN	  in	  order	  that	  it	  might	  produce	  more	  specific	  recommendations.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  social	  policy,	  such	  as	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pensions,	  where	  recommendations	  are	  more	  detailed	  and	  regularly	  amended,	  and	  embedded	  in	  a	  pan-­‐European	  network	  of	  officials	  and	  experts	  40.	  
5.	  Discussion	  	  How	  do	  we	  understand	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  EU’s	  fiscal	  governance	  system?	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  evaluate	  it.	  This	  section	  first	  examines	  it	  on	  its	  own	  narrow	  terms:	  will	  member	  states	  comply?	  It	  then	  discusses	  the	  specific	  effect	  on	  healthcare	  systems.	  ####	  in	  this	  issue	  discusses	  the	  impact	  of	  austerity	  on	  health	  outcomes.	  	  
Fiscal	  governance	  on	  its	  own	  terms:	  compliance	  	  The	  first	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  new	  fiscal	  governance	  regime	  will	  gain	  compliance.	  That	  can	  be	  answered	  in	  several	  ways.	  	   First,	  comparative	  analysis	  can	  benefit	  from	  an	  abundance	  of	  cases	  of	  such	  balanced	  budget	  rules	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Forty-­‐nine	  of	  the	  fifty	  states	  have	  balanced-­‐budget	  provisions	  in	  their	  constitutions,	  mostly	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  which	  makes	  them	  the	  largest	  pool	  of	  jurisdictions	  with	  a	  history	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  obligations	  Europeans	  have	  now	  adopted.	  Their	  record	  is	  not	  encouraging.	  Essentially	  all	  of	  the	  states	  have	  debt	  in	  some	  sense	  (such	  as	  special	  authorities	  for	  capital	  expenditure	  or	  underfunded	  pension	  plans)	  and	  courts	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  very	  deferential	  to	  governments	  41.	  If	  the	  US	  courts	  have	  largely	  been	  deferential	  to	  state	  governments,	  because	  of	  the	  complexity	  and	  political	  salience	  of	  budgeting,	  what	  are	  the	  odds	  that	  the	  member	  state	  courts	  (or	  the	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CJEU,	  should	  a	  member	  state	  refuse	  to	  respond	  to	  an	  adverse	  Council	  decision)	  would	  be	  more	  assertive?	  	  	   Second,	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  EU’s	  record	  is	  not	  positive	  for	  fiscal	  governance	  measures.	  As	  the	  “prehistory”	  section	  above	  showed,	  the	  EU’s	  regulatory	  approach	  to	  fiscal	  governance	  has	  been	  faced	  serious	  compliance	  problems,	  notably	  the	  2005	  revisions	  to	  the	  SGP	  when	  Germany	  and	  France	  agreed	  to	  change	  the	  pact	  that	  they	  had	  both	  violated.	  The	  broad	  fiscal	  governance	  architecture	  shows	  signs	  of	  heading	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  Spain	  has	  already	  been	  granted	  some	  latitude	  despite	  breaching	  its	  targets	  in	  2014,	  and	  so	  has	  France.	  Defining	  concepts	  such	  as	  a	  deficit,	  let	  alone	  a	  structural	  deficit,	  also	  remains	  difficult	  and	  contentious	  42.	  The	  political	  stakes	  of	  declaring	  a	  major	  EU	  state	  noncompliant,	  and	  potentially	  triggering	  corrective	  action,	  are	  high	  enough	  to	  create	  reasons	  for	  the	  Commission	  and	  Council	  to	  use	  what	  latitude	  remains	  to	  them	  to	  avoid	  taking	  such	  an	  action.	  The	  credibility	  of	  the	  EU’s	  commitment	  remains	  to	  be	  seen:	  Spain	  has	  already	  been	  allowed	  to	  escape	  penalties	  because	  its	  reform	  plans	  impressed	  the	  Council.	  Italy	  and	  France	  might	  be	  the	  crucial	  cases.	  	   Third,	  an	  end	  to	  crisis	  economic	  situation	  might	  be	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  system.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  analysis,	  there	  is	  a	  major	  confounding	  factor	  in	  analyzing	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  so	  far	  (we	  make	  this	  argument	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  (author	  2015).	  While	  the	  logic	  of	  Troika	  loans	  and	  the	  new	  fiscal	  governance	  is	  that	  it	  will	  credibly	  prevent	  policies	  that	  expand	  government	  debt	  and	  thereby	  reassure	  markets,	  the	  actual	  calm	  on	  European	  markets	  has	  been	  due	  to	  actions	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  43.	  ECB	  President	  Mario	  Draghi	  turned	  the	  crisis	  with	  a	  speech	  in	  which	  he	  said	  the	  ECB	  would	  do	  “whatever	  it	  takes”	  to	  prevent	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	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Eurozone.	  Interest	  rates	  on	  government	  debt	  in	  the	  peripheral	  countries	  immediately	  dropped.	  Later	  the	  ECB	  announced	  a	  program,	  called	  Outright	  Monetary	  Transactions	  (OMT),	  that	  would	  have	  involved	  purchasing	  and	  thereby	  supporting	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  debt.	  The	  OMT	  program	  was	  never	  implemented,	  and	  was	  of	  doubtful	  legality,	  but	  it	  calmed	  markets	  by	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  debt	  holders	  betting	  on	  a	  breakup	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  would	  be	  outmatched	  by	  a	  central	  bank	  with	  money-­‐creation	  powers.	  Interest	  rates	  on	  peripheral	  debt	  dropped	  further,	  almost	  to	  pre-­‐2008	  levels.	  This	  history	  suggests	  that	  it	  was	  ECB	  action,	  rather	  than	  a	  credible	  promise	  of	  future	  austere	  fiscal	  policy,	  that	  actually	  preserved	  the	  Eurozone.	  	  	   As	  for	  compliance	  with	  CSRs	  in	  health,	  the	  problem	  for	  evaluation	  is	  that	  they	  are	  so	  generic.	  The	  first	  serious	  evaluation	  of	  the	  Semester,	  produced	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  research	  staff,	  was	  harsh.	  	  Across	  all	  member	  states	  and	  policy	  fields	  it	  found	  that	  EU	  member	  states	  fully	  implemented	  an	  average	  of	  17%	  of	  CSRs	  and	  completely	  failed	  to	  implement	  44%.	  The	  rate	  of	  non	  –implementation	  ranged	  from	  64%	  in	  recalcitrant	  Slovenia	  to	  17%	  in	  dutiful	  Italy	  44.	  Health	  compliance	  data	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  generic	  nature	  of	  the	  recommendations.	  A	  later	  evaluation,	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  produced	  different	  results,	  with	  the	  ranking	  of	  countries	  rather	  different,	  and	  much	  more	  positive	  view	  with	  some	  progress	  on	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  CSRs	  45.	  According	  to	  a	  Commission	  assessment,	  the	  implementation	  record	  of	  the	  health	  and	  long-­‐term	  care	  CSRs	  is	  estimated	  at	  35	  %,	  based	  on	  a	  synthetic	  indicator	  of	  EU-­‐wide	  implementation	  (the	  best	  compliance	  was	  with	  the	  fiscal	  and	  financial	  policy	  CSRs).	  Provisionally,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  smaller	  and	  weaker	  states	  in	  the	  Semester,	  and	  not	  just	  the	  ones	  in	  worse	  trouble,	  are	  more	  influenced	  than	  larger	  and	  economically	  healthier	  states.	  	  
	   27	  
	   The	  comparative	  data,	  historical	  EU	  data,	  and	  short	  history	  of	  the	  new	  fiscal	  governance	  all	  call	  its	  implementation	  into	  question:	  the	  tough	  “law	  on	  the	  books”	  of	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  might	  not	  be	  matched	  by	  the	  “law	  on	  the	  streets”	  of	  policymaking	  and	  budgeting.	  The	  United	  States	  experience,	  though,	  shows	  that	  imperfect	  compliance	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  law	  can	  be	  good	  compliance	  from	  a	  policy	  perspective;	  U.S.	  states	  generally	  do	  have	  budgets	  in	  rough	  balance,	  and	  are	  accordingly	  procyclical	  and	  given	  to	  cut	  back	  social	  policy	  expenditure	  just	  when	  needs	  are	  greatest.	  The	  policing	  seems	  to	  be	  because	  markets	  use	  balanced	  budgets	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  investment	  quality	  41.	  	  	  What	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  on	  healthcare	  systems?	  Separating	  fiscal	  governance	  from	  general	  austerity	  policies	  is	  difficult;	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Latvia,	  European	  influence	  can	  actually	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  social	  expenditure	  than	  member	  state	  governments.	  	  There	  are	  some	  striking	  specific	  examples,	  mostly	  to	  do	  with	  communicable	  disease	  control;	  cutting	  AIDS	  treatment	  budgets	  has	  led	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  infection	  in	  Greece,	  and	  cutting	  mosquito	  abatement	  budgets	  in	  Greece	  led	  to	  a	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  malaria	  46,	  47.	  Countries	  in	  the	  Excessive	  Deficit,	  Balance	  of	  Payments,	  or	  Troika	  procedures,	  and	  in	  fact	  most	  others,	  have	  increased	  co-­‐payments,	  limited	  services	  and	  access	  to	  services	  for	  segments	  of	  the	  population,	  as	  well	  as	  cutting	  workforce,	  pensions,	  or	  public	  sector	  pay	  and	  benefits	  34,	  48-­‐50.	  The	  result,	  unsurprisingly,	  has	  been	  an	  increasing	  percentage	  of	  people	  in	  countries	  subject	  to	  EU	  austerity	  programs	  who	  report	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  healthcare	  due	  to	  inability	  to	  pay	  34.	  	  What	  is	  the	  overall	  effect?	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Semester	  in	  health	  is	  not	  having	  big	  specific	  effects	  yet:	  generic	  calls	  for	  reorganization	  are	  having	  less	  effect	  than	  cruder,	  more	  direct	  policies	  to	  reduce	  expenditure	  such	  as	  reduction	  in	  access,	  reduction	  in	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pay,	  or	  less	  expenditure.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  prospect	  of	  violating	  fiscal	  targets	  seems	  to	  be	  driving	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  policy	  reform	  in	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  formal	  EU	  fiscal	  architecture	  is	  hard	  to	  clearly	  identify	  here,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  is	  new	  and	  in	  part	  because	  austerity	  is	  overdetermined	  in	  most	  member	  states	  (by	  bond	  markets,	  the	  ECB,	  and	  right-­‐wing	  electoral	  coalitions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  formal	  EU	  architecture;	  the	  UK,	  for	  example,	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  fiscal	  compact	  but	  us	  pursuing	  austerity	  policies).	  Putting	  the	  two	  together,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  framework,	  reinforced	  by	  the	  threat	  of	  central	  bank	  and	  market	  responses,	  constrains	  member	  states	  and	  thereby	  forces	  them	  to	  make	  reforms.	  The	  specific	  content	  of	  the	  CSRs	  is	  less	  effective,	  not	  because	  it	  is	  manipulated	  by	  member	  states	  but	  because	  it	  is	  generic	  and	  because	  the	  most	  specific	  recommendations	  are	  justified	  by	  the	  weakest	  legal	  base,	  namely	  the	  Europe	  2020	  strategy.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  process	  develops	  the	  recommendations	  will	  get	  more	  specific	  and	  member	  states	  will	  face	  more	  implementation	  pressure.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  	  Healthcare	  systems	  and	  policies	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  larger	  political	  economies	  of	  nations:	  from	  access	  to	  regulation	  to	  public	  health	  policies,	  political	  forces	  and	  systems	  shape	  healthcare	  systems.	  Those	  larger	  political	  economies	  are	  shaped	  by	  larger	  forces	  than	  the	  healthcare	  systems;	  politicians	  are	  elected	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  reasons	  unconnected	  to	  health	  policy,	  and	  make	  tradeoffs	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policies	  and	  objectives.	  	  	  	   Fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  health	  systems	  are	  embedded	  in	  larger	  political	  projects.	  A	  financial	  crisis	  turned	  into	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	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In	  the	  hands	  of	  Europe’s	  largely	  right-­‐wing	  governments,	  the	  crisis	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  short-­‐term	  austere	  response	  in	  the	  Troika,	  and	  a	  longer-­‐term	  form	  in	  the	  reinforcement	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  system.	  Healthcare	  is	  an	  expensive	  part	  of	  the	  budget,	  and	  so	  it	  was	  an	  obvious	  target	  for	  reformers	  concerned	  with	  immediate	  savings	  and	  longer-­‐term	  reforms	  that	  would	  enable	  compliance	  with	  the	  SGP	  through	  prudent	  budgeting.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  ambitious	  effort	  with	  clear	  political	  objectives	  to	  coordinate	  member	  state	  health	  policies	  and	  empower	  governments	  to	  make	  structural	  reforms	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  objectives.	  	   The	  ambition	  of	  the	  new	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  is	  impressive:	  tightly	  coordinated	  policy	  and	  budget	  making	  focused	  on	  public	  deficits	  and	  debt	  and	  enforced	  by	  all	  the	  EU	  institutions.	  It	  is	  an	  ambitious,	  and	  ideological	  project	  by	  the	  current	  liberal/	  right	  coalition	  in	  Europe	  to	  lock	  in	  their	  small-­‐government	  preferences	  for	  the	  future.	  	  	  It	  might	  not	  work.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  EU	  leaders	  have	  created	  a	  large	  and	  invasive	  mechanism	  for	  monitoring	  and	  shaping	  member	  state	  policy	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  SGP	  that	  will	  fail	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  neither	  being	  implemented	  nor	  producing	  the	  economic	  growth	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  remedy	  the	  EU’s	  social	  problems	  51.	  But	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  EU’s	  framework	  has	  helped	  to	  anchor	  expectations:	  only	  member	  state	  that	  are	  compliant	  or	  reforming	  to	  be	  complaint	  will	  receive	  help	  from	  the	  ECB	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EU	  41.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Semester	  is	  producing	  a	  learning	  process	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  more	  specific	  reform	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  evaluated-­‐	  and	  yet	  will	  still	  be	  grounded	  in	  fiscal	  austerity	  rather	  than	  health	  goals.	  Either	  outcome	  would	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  health	  of	  Europeans	  as	  well	  as	  the	  health	  of	  European	  politics.	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